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Abstract:			 This	paper	tentatively	sketches	out	a	model	of	guilt.	It	is	based	on	hermeneutic-phenomenological	 analyses	 of	 five	 men’s	 accounts	 of	 feeling	 guilty	 and	 is	informed	by	phenomenological	and	narrative	theory.	The	model	maps	how	guilt	unfolds	 through	 time	 in	 a	 looping,	 iterative	manner.	 Initially,	 guilt	 feelings	 are	overwhelming	 and	 immediate,	 such	 that	 time	 seems	 to	 collapse.	 The	 guilt	process	 then	 unfolds	 into	 two	 ‘parallel	 returns’;	 temporal	 loops	 wherein	 an	individual	first	relives	their	guilt	feelings	(a	‘bodily	return’)	and	then	re-narrates	the	 experience	 (a	 ‘narrative	 return’)	 in	 numerous	 iterations,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	make	sense	of	what	has	happened.	The	 final	phase	maps	 the	resolution:	as	 the	narrative	 becomes	 more	 adequate,	 sense-making	 becomes	 easier,	 and	 bodily	experience	 is	 incorporated	 into	 over-arching	 life	 narratives	 in	 a	 process	 of	synthesis.	 When	 this	 happens,	 the	 experience	 shifts	 from	 feeling	 ‘stuck’	 to	progression.	Mapping	guilt	in	this	way	offers	insight	into	the	interplay	between	temporality,	 feelings	 and	 narrative	 in	 this	 particular	 experience,	 but	may	 also	
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provide	 a	 framework	 to	 consider	 how	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 	 ‘work	 through’	 other	difficult	emotional	experiences.	
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“The	 reality	 of	 a	 life	 lived	 in	 time	 is	 a	 perpetual	weaving	 of	fresh	 threads	which	 link	 events	 and	 lives	 –	 threads	 that	 are	crossed	and	rewound,	doubled	and	re-doubled	to	thicken	the	web.”		(Lloyd,	1993,	p144)	
	This	 paper	 sketches	 out	 a	 model	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 felt,	 temporal,	 and	narrative	aspects	of	a	guilt	experience.	The	model,	 in	 the	 form	of	an	experiential	map,	illustrates	 how	 guilt	 unfolds	 as	 a	 looping,	 iterative	 process.	 It	 was	 derived	 from	experiential	 and	 theoretical	 material,	 including	 hermeneutic-phenomenological	analyses	 of	 five	 first-person	 accounts	 (Boden,	 2013;	 Boden	 &	 Eatough,	 2014),	 and	phenomenological	 and	 narrative	 theory.	 As	 Lloyd	 (1993)	 suggests	 above,	 lived	experience	 is	 the	 product	 of	 weaving	 together	 disparate	 aspects	 through	 an	 iterative	process	 that	 unfolds	 in	 time.	 The	 map	 described	 in	 this	 paper	 focuses	 on	 how	 the	experiential	threads	of	feeling	and	narrative	are	interwoven	temporally	in	a	unique	way	that	accounts	for	what	it	is	like	to	feel	guilty.	However,	we	hope	mapping	this	process	of	shuttling	 between	 felt	 and	narrative	 experience	may	 shed	 light	 on	 how	other	 difficult	emotional	experiences	unfold,	are	understood,	and	are	‘worked	through’.		
1.	What	is	guilt?	A	brief	orientation	There	 are	 many	 types	 of	 guilt:	 legal,	 technical,	 ontological,	 theological	 (Baumeister,	Stillwell	 &	 Heatherton,	 1994),	 as	 well	 as	 feelings	 of	 guilt,	 which	 are	 the	 focus	 of	 this	paper.	Guilt	is	a	common	phenomenon	and	generally	speaking	we	know	what	it	is	like	to	feel	 guilty	 (Savoie,	 1996),	 yet,	 empirically	 guilt	 is	 elusive	 (Baumeister,	 Stillwell	 &	Heatherton,	 1995),	 and	 conceptual	 definitions	 of	 guilt	 remain	 contentious.	 Most	researchers	agree	that	guilt	is	a	dysphoric	feeling	(e.g.	Harder	&	Zalma,	1990),	which	can	be	chronic	and	pathological,	or	mild	and	 transitory	 (Kubany	&	Watson,	2003).	Guilt	 is	
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connected	 to	 having	 done,	 thought	 or	 intended	 to	 do	 something	 that	 puts	 one	 in	 the	wrong	 (Baumeister	 et	 al.,	 1994;	 Kubany	 &	 Watson,	 2003),	 and	 involves	 violating	 “a	personally	relevant	moral	or	social	standard”	(Kugler	&	Jones,	1992,	p318).	Sabini	and	Silver	(2005)	argue	that	the	feeling-state	of	guilt	is	just	what	guilty	people	feel,	however,	others	criticise	this,	arguing	there	is	no	straightforward	link	between	being	and	feeling	guilty	 (Tangney,	Mashek	and	Stuewig,	2005;	Kubany	&	Watson,	2003;	Kugler	&	 Jones,	1992;	McGraw,	1987).	It	is	the	perception	of	responsibility	that	is	more	important	than	a	guilty	act	(Baumeister	et	al.,	1994).			Guilt	 is	 generally	not	defined	as	 a	 ‘pure’	 emotion,	 in	 the	way	 that	 anger,	 fear,	 sadness	and	 joy	 are	 (Elison,	 2005),	 although	 it	 is	 often	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 the	 ‘family’	 of	 self-conscious	emotions,	 along	with	 shame,	 embarrassment	and	pride	 (Fischer	&	Tangney,	1995).	Instead,	guilt	is	often	defined	as	a	mixture	of	interrelated	affective	and	cognitive	aspects,	 alongside	 contextual	 factors	 such	 as	 relationship	 to	 the	 person	 harmed,	proximity	of	the	event	and	the	irreparability	of	the	harm	caused	(Elison,	2005;	Kubany	&	Watson,	2003;	Lewis,	1993;	Roseman,	Wiest	&	Swartz,	1994;	Tracy	&	Robins,	2004;	2006).	 Most	 empirical	 research	 on	 guilt	 in	 general	 populations	 is	 quantitative	 and	conceptualises	 it	 as	 either	 prosocial,	 in	 that	 it	 reinforces	 interpersonal	 relationships	through	prompting	reparative	acts	(e.g.	Tangney	&	Dearing,	2002)	or	as	maladaptive,	in	that	it	is	intrapsychically	damaging	and	painful	(e.g.	Harder,	1995).			There	has	been	very	 little	qualitative	enquiry	 into	guilt,	but	those	studies	that	do	exist	(Brooke,	1985;	Karlsson	&	Sjöberg,	2009;	Lindsay-Hartz,	1984;	Lindsay-Hartz,	de	Rivera	&	Mascolo,	1995)	problematise	the	prosocial/maladaptive	dichotomy	and	illuminate	the	subtle	 and	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 lived	 experience.	 Together	 the	 qualitative	 literature	suggests	 that	 far	 from	 straightforwardly	 taking	 responsibility	 for	 their	 actions,	 people	are	often	confused	about	what	they	have	done,	why	they	did	it,	and	what	they	should	do	
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about	 it,	 with	 reparation	 sometimes	 being	 seen	 as	 either	 impossible,	 or	 not	 the	 best	choice	of	 action.	Guilt	 is	 painful,	 and	 associated	with	 threats	 to	 self-identity	 as	people	struggle	 to	 reconcile	 their	 actions	 with	 their	 image	 of	 themselves,	 as	 well	 as	 to	relationships,	 as	 people	 may	 hide	 aspects	 of	 themselves	 and	 become	 secretive.	 Our	qualitative	 studies	 sought	 to	 explore	 guilt	 from	 an	 idiographic	 perspective	 and	 in	 the	context	 of	 romantic	 relationships,	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 embodied,	relational	and	idiosyncratic	ways	that	guilt	may	be	lived.		In	this	paper,	we	situate	those	accounts	within	phenomenological	and	narrative	theory	in	an	attempt	to	offer	a	model	that	comprehensively	describes	the	guilt	experience,	as	it	is	lived.		
2.	Mapping	the	guilt	process	Emotion	experiences	do	not	necessarily	unfold	in	a	straightforward	or	rational	manner	(Goldie,	 2003),	 and	 guilt	 seems	 be	 a	 particularly	 looping,	 tentative	 and	 jolting	experience.	We	become	out	of	sync	with	the	authentic	unfolding	of	time	as	guilt	ties	us	to	a	past	 that	we	are	unable	 to	 influence	or	alter	(Fuchs,	2003).	 It	 is	our	awareness	of	this	 fixity	 and	 our	 impotence	 that	 feels	 so	 distressing,	 and	which	 reveals	 guilt	 as	 the	“real	insight	into	the	irreversibility	of	lived	time”	(Buber,	1957,	p116).			[Figure	1	about	here]		In	guilt,	time	is	experienced	as	either	retarded,	as	the	focus	shifts	to	the	past,	to	what	has	been	 done,	 and	 to	 reliving	 the	 difficult	 feelings	 of	 guilt	 through	 looping,	 haunting	experiences,	or	it	is	accelerated,	as	the	focus	shifts	to	the	future	and	an	impatient	desire	to	progress.	It	is	this	asynchronism	(Fuchs,	2001;	2005)	that	we	attempt	to	sketch	out	in	this	 experiential	 map	 (see	 Figure	 1).	 The	 map	 describes	 how	 after	 the	 subjectively	perceived	 ‘wrong-doing’	of	 the	guilt	event,	guilt	 feelings	are	 initially	experienced	as	an	overwhelming	 immediacy,	 which	 seems	 to	 exist	 outside	 of	 narrative	 time,	 as	 an	
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‘atemporal’	moment.	This	 is	quickly	 followed	by	 two	 ‘parallel	 returns’;	 temporal	 loops	where	 guilt	 is	 first	 re-lived	 (the	 ‘bodily	 return’)	 and	 then	 re-narrated	 (the	 ‘narrative	return’),	until	 finally,	 and	 if	possible,	 synthesis	between	 the	 felt	 and	narrative	 loops	 is	reached	through	a	process	of	trial	and	error.	Once	the	narrative	is	able	to	take	account	of	the	bodily	feelings,	progression	is	possible	as	the	person	makes	meaningful	sense	of	their	experience	by	embedding	it	within	the	context	of	their	lifeworld.		Data	from	five	men’s	accounts	of	guilt	in	the	context	of	romantic	relationships	was	used	to	develop	this	map,	but	in	this	paper	we	will	primarily	draw	on	one	case	study	–	Sam.	Data	 were	 originally	 collected	 through	 semi-structured	 interviews	 that	 specifically	sought	to	encourage	participants	to	attune	to	their	bodily	memories	of	the	events,	and	to	describe	 these	 as	 richly	 as	 possible	 (e.g.	 metaphorical	 verbal	 accounts,	 abstract	drawings).	 The	 analytic	 approach	 drew	 on	 hermeneutic-phenomenological	 principles,	shuttling	 between	 empathic	 and	 questioning	 hermeneutic	 strategies	 and	 embodied-reflexive	 practices.	 This	 resulted	 in	 idiographic	 and	 group-level	 analyses	 that	 were	structured	thematically	and	drawn	inductively	from	the	data,	which	included	the	spoken,	drawn,	 and	 embodied-reflexive	 material.	 The	 analysis	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	represents	an	extension	 to	 the	 initial	 analysis.	 	The	aim	was	 to	deepen	understanding	through	 a	 rigorous	 dialogue	with	 the	 conceptual	 literature,	 namely	 phenomenological	and	 narrative	 theory.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 final	 stage	 of	 analysis	 was	 abductive	 in	 that	 it	integrates	empirical	findings	with	existing	conceptual	accounts	from	within	and	outside	psychology	in	order	to	create	a	novel	theory,	in	this	case	our	tentative	‘map’.	For	fuller	details	 of	 the	methodological	 approach	 see	Boden	&	Eatough	 (2014),	 and	 for	 detailed	findings	 see	 Boden	 (2013).	 Ethical	 approval	 was	 granted,	 all	 names	 used	 are	pseudonyms,	and	some	details	have	been	obscured	to	protect	the	participants’	identities.			
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Sam	described	 an	 experience	 of	 guilt	 relating	 to	 ending	 a	 relationship	with	 a	woman,	Gemma,	five	years	prior	to	our	interview.	They	had	lived	together	for	three	years.	Sam	had	 been	 trying	 to	 “forge”	 a	 relationship	 with	 Gemma	 at	 a	 time	 when	 he	 was	 also	meeting	 new	 friends.	 He	 felt	 he	 had	 to	 work	 hard	 to	 establish	 his	 relationship	 with	Gemma,	yet	he	easily	developed	new	friendships,	and	these	soon	fell	 into	competition.	He	and	Gemma	spent	more	 time	apart	and	ultimately	decided	 to	end	 the	 relationship,	with	Gemma	moving	back	overseas.	As	he	said	goodbye	 to	Gemma	at	 the	airport,	Sam	suddenly	felt	overcome	by	a	deep	guilt.	Later,	sitting	in	his	empty	flat,	he	realised	how	little	 he	 had	 put	 into	making	 the	 relationship	work,	 and	making	 a	 home	with	 her.	He	started	 to	 think	about	all	 the	 times	he	had	made	her	 cry,	 and	 realised	he	 should	have	been	 there	 for	her	more	often,	 especially	 as	 she	had	no	 family	 in	 the	 country.	He	 saw	himself	 as	 selfish,	 and	 described	 feeling	 deeply	 guilty	 about	 how	 he	 had	 treated	 her.	Sam’s	experience,	as	an	illustration	of	the	experiential	map	of	guilt,	is	set	out	below.		
2.1	Atemporal	guilt	feelings:	Immediacy	and	‘nowness’	The	initial	experience	of	guilt	is	characterised	by	bodily	feelings	that	are	experienced	as	a)	 immediate,	 b)	 overwhelming,	 c)	 dislocating,	 and	 then	 reflectively	 as	 d)	 senseless.	Firstly,	the	guilt	experience	is	described	as	immediate	and	engulfing,	it	“takes	over	really,	
really	quickly”	(Edward),	being	experienced	as	“just	suddenly	[coming]	in	at	once”	(Sam).	It	 seems	 as	 though	 participants	 experience	 guilt-feelings	 as	 fast	 and	 strong,	 flooding	them.	 Secondly,	 they	 feel	 overwhelmed	 by	 these	 feelings,	 which	 are	 “intense”	 and	
“overriding”	 (Jamie),	 so	 much	 so	 that	 they	 experience	 a	 sort	 of	 dissociation,	 as	 Luke	describes	how	guilt	“sort	of	washed	over	me”,	leaving	him	“empty”.	Or	they	seek	ways	to	numb	the	feelings	by	“getting	smashed”	(Sam)	or	burying	their	head	in	the	sand	(Luke).	Thirdly,	 guilt-feelings	 involve	 a	 sense	 of	 dislocation	 from	 the	 world,	 instability	 and	uncertainty.	Edward	is	“at	a	loss”,	Luke	felt	“weakened”	and	like	he	was	“sinking”,	 Jamie	described	how	“everything	had	dropped	away”,	and	they	struggle	to	know	“where	you’re	
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going	to	go”		(Luke)	or	“what	quite	to	do”	(Michael).	Fourthly,	at	the	reflective	level,	this	disruption	 in	the	participants’	 lifeworld,	experienced	bodily	as	 the	sudden	and	 intense	felt-states	 of	 guilt,	 is	 echoed	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	 make-sense	 of	 the	 experience.	Participants	struggle	to	find	logical	or	rational	ways	to	explain	the	sudden	shift	in	their	embodied-being-in-the-world.	They	describe	the	experience	as	not	making	“much	sense”	(Michael),	 as	 being	 “muddied”	 and	 “blurred”	 (Luke),	 or	 “uncertain”	 (Edward),	 and	 as	feeling	 “out	 of	 control”	 (Jamie	 and	Michael).	 It	 seems	 that	 they	 lack	 clarity	 about	 the	events	and	their	corresponding	guilt-feelings.			This	 is	 illustrated	 in	 Sam’s	 account	where	 these	 four	 strands	 (immediacy,	 overwhelm,	dislocation	 and	 sensenlessness)	 interweave	 in	 his	 account	 and	 are	 exemplified	 in	 the	metaphors	he	uses	to	describe	his	experience.	Guilt	hit	Sam	suddenly	and	unexpectedly,	flooding	 him	with	 feelings	 (‘immediacy’	 and	 ‘overwhelm’).	 He	 describes	 being	 in	 “the	
foulest	 mood”,	 a	 pervasive	 and	 abhorrent	 feeling.	 Sam’s	 guilt	 is	 a	 potion	 of	 different	emotional	and	cognitive	experiences	all	at	once:	“honesty,	regret,	sadness	and	anxiety,	all	
in	 portions	 in	 the	 same	 bottle”.	 He	 describes	 an	 altered	 sense	 of	 being-in-the-world	(‘dislocation’),	 going	 “into	guilt	mode”,	where	 his	 shoulders	 drop	 and	 roll	 forward,	 his	chest	hollows	inwards	and	he	feels	tense	and	“physical”.	His	stomach	collapses	inside	his	body	 as	 if	 he	 is	 in	 free-fall,	 while	 his	 throat	 tightens.	 Sam	 identifies	 these	 localised	internal	 body-parts	 because	 they	 are	 lifted	 into	 his	 awareness	 through	 his	 guilt.	 His	stomach,	 breathing	 and	 heart	which	were	 once	 ‘transparent’,	 are	 now	 ‘corporealised’.	Fuchs,	(2003;	2005)	suggests	this	shift	 from	transparency	to	corporealisation	happens	in	a	number	of	states	(depression,	 fatigue,	shame	etc.)	and	causes	 the	body	to	become	objectified	 and	 an	 obstacle	 to	 fluid	 being-in-the-world.	 Sam’s	 body	 is	 brought	 with	immediacy	into	the	here-now	and	his	sense	of	himself	is	disrupted;	he	feels	choked,	he	struggles	to	breathe	with	the	tightness	in	his	chest.	His	body	no	longer	volunteers	access	to	the	world,	but	is	experienced	as	separate	and	isolated	(Fuchs,	2003).	
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	Guilt	 has	 invaded	 Sam’s	 most	 vulnerable	 bodily	 spaces	 under	 his	 rib-cage,	 and	 has	secretly	eaten	away	there.	He	uses	two	metaphors	to	capture	this	diminishment:		
Like	if	you	opened	a	banana	that	looks,	looks	like	it	was	brand	new,	but	it	was	all	black	
and	minging	inside,	this,	it’s	definitely	something	that	eats	away	in	the	centre.	
	Whilst	on	the	outside,	Sam	appears	unscathed,	inside	guilt	has	made	him	rotten.	This	is	a	feeling-led	 spontaneous	 and	 idiosyncratic	 variation	of	 a	normative	metaphor	of	moral	decay.	The	 feelings	of	badness	 in	his	 rotten	banana	embody	his	 self-disgust,	 capturing	the	 self-condemnation	 that	 can	 be	 part	 of	 guilt	 (Solomon,	 1993).	 In	 a	 second	 equally	powerful	 image,	Sam	again	contrasts	a	superficially	good	self,	with	the	suddenly	guilty	self:	
If	you	imagine	a	3D	cube,	a	perfect	3D	cube	made	of	paper,	and	then	it	was	sucked	in	
in	the	middle,	an’	then	it	just	all	crumpled	inwards.	[…]	It	was	all	like	‘yep	fine’	then	
suddenly	 something	 shrinks	 in,	 and	 all	 no	 more	 have	 you	 got	 straight	 lines	 and	
perfect	corners,	you’re	 just	c-,	crunched	in	and	not	the	perfect	shape	that	you	were	
before.	It’s	like	the	middle	gets	sucked	in.	
	Sam	initially	identifies	with	the	“perfect	3D	cube”.	A	cube	connotes	certain	qualities;	it	is	rigid,	defensive,	 impenetrable,	 inflexible.	The	absolute	symmetry	provides	an	 image	of	Sam	 as	 solid,	 strong,	 dependable,	 rational	 –	 all	 traits	 associated	 with	 hegemonic	masculinity.	 Yet,	 then	 Sam	 says	 it	 is	 a	 paper	 cube,	 and	 suddenly	 the	 image	 shifts	revealing	 his	 vulnerability.	 Sam	 used	 his	 hands	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 cube’s	 imagined	surface	and	sharp	straight	sides.	Then	his	 fingers	began	to	twist	and	curl	slowly	as	his	perfect	cube	collapsed.	The	totality	of	this	crumpling	is	emphasised	in	his	“all	no	more”.	In	his	guilt-mode,	he	is	ruined.	
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	Emotion	 experience	 can	 involve	 specific,	 localised	 bodily	 feelings	 (collapsed	 stomach,	tight	 throat),	 diffuse	 whole-body	 experiences	 (the	 foul	 mood),	 and	 more	 background	bodily	 feelings,	 such	 as	 Sam’s	 sense	 of	 crumpled	 rottenness	 (Colombetti,	 2011)	 that	indicate	his	relation	to	the	world,	as	vulnerable,	broken.	As	Sam’s	body	becomes	explicit	and	his	feelings	overwhelm	him,	his	temporal	experience	also	collapses:		
“it	was	 like	 just	 being	 given	 a	 sort	 of	 shot	 of	 everything	 you’ve	 just	 -	 all	 your	 guilty	
memories	just	suddenly	came	in	at	once.”		Guilt	 seems	 to	 attack	 Sam	 forcefully,	 and	 suffuse	 him	with	 painful	memories,	 coming	into	 his	 body	 “all	 at	 once”,	 like	 a	 “shot”	 –	 sudden,	 violent,	 unexpected	 –	 flooding	 his	present.			Time	can	be	seen	as	the	“basic	scaffolding”	of	our	lives	(O’Brien,	2007,	p212).	It	is	not	so	much	a	‘thing’	as	a	“dimension	of	our	being”,	an	unfolding	that	giving	both	meaning	and	direction	to	our	lives	(Merleau-Ponty	2002/1945,	p483).	In	guilt,	initial	painful	feelings	are	 experienced	 as	 immediate,	 permanently	 present,	 and	 ‘stuck’,	 with	 no	 chance	 of	progression	 (Wyllie,	 2005).	 Wyllie	 (2005,	 p176)	 suggests	 that	 in	 painful	 experiences	“one	suffering	moment	begins	 to	resemble	 the	next	suffering	moment”,	 indicating	 that	the	unfolding	nature	of	 lived	 time	 is	arrested.	This	quality	of	 ‘nowness’	 is	also	 seen	 in	phenomenological	descriptions	of	physical	pain,	which	suggest	the	subject	is	pulled	into	the	present	where	the	pain	exists	(Leder,	1990).	In	this	moment,	the	temporal	horizon	is	experienced	 as	 very	 narrow;	 the	 immediacy	 of	 the	 overwhelming	 feelings	 is	 all	 that	there	is.		Something	similar,	momentarily,	seems	to	happen	in	guilt.		
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If	 the	 unity	 of	 temporality	 (past-present-future)	 is	 altered,	 then	 the	 coherence	 and	meaningfulness	of	one’s	life	is	also	disrupted	(Stolorow,	2007)	and	it	can	feel	as	though	the	world	has	been	‘turned	over’	(Munro	&	Belova,	2009).	Participants	described	feeling	overwhelmed,	being	unable	to	act,	and	feeling	disoriented	and	confused.	Feelings	were	amorphous.	They	appeared	“suddenly”	and	“didn’t	feel	anything	like	it	was	supposed	to”,	suggesting	the	body	is	“surprised,	perhaps,	by	being	caught	‘out	of	line’;	by	finding	itself	at	odds	in	a	‘world’	that	had	been	predicted	or	anticipated”	(Munro	&	Belova,	2009,	p92).			This	pattern	of	overwhelm	and	confusion	echoes	that	seen	in	trauma	responses,	though	by	 drawing	 this	 analogy	we	 are	mindful	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 traumatic	 events,	such	 as	 abuse	 or	 accident,	 and	 the	 ‘emotional	 trauma’	 (Stolorow,	 2007)	 of	 some	 guilt	experiences.	However,	O’Brien	 (2007)	 lists	disorientation,	 confusion,	 feeling	uncertain	and	 losing	 track	 of	 time	 as	 typical	 of	 traumatic	 responses,	 and	 these	were	 echoed	 in	participants’	accounts.	In	emotional	trauma	the	feeling	of	stability	and	predictability	in	the	world	 is	 altered,	 causing	being-in-time	 to	be	 reorganised	or	disorganised,	 and	 the	sense	 of	 self	 to	 be	 disrupted,	 and	 this	 is	 reflected	 in	 participants’	 metaphoric	descriptions	of	going	to	a	“dark	place”	(Michael),	or	feeling	like	being	spun	around	in	a	“whirlpool”	 or	 lost	 at	 sea	 (Jamie).	 Whereas	 in	 a	 traumatic	 experience	 “time	 comes	undone”	as	the	structural	and	organising	principles	of	time	collapse	in	the	face	of	one’s	imminent	death	(O’Brien,	2007,	p209),	in	guilt	it	is	one’s	moral	integrity	and	a	sense	of	self	 as	 familiar	 and	 predictable	 that	 feels	 threatened.	 In	 both,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	moment	whereby	“[e]vents	become	suspended	in	time	or	perhaps	more	accurately	out	of	time”	(O’Brien,	2007,	p212).	This	atemporal	moment	cannot	be	adequately	narrated;	it	is	a	feeling	that	things	“just	went	on”	and	were	“on-going”	(Edward)	without	order	or	structure.		
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Narratives,	the	stories	we	tell	about	an	episode	of	our	life,	and	our	lives	as	a	whole,	are	particularly	sensitive	 to	 temporal	order	 (Polkinghorne,	1988).	When	an	experience	no	longer	seems	to	follow	the	usual	temporal	sequence	(past-present-future),	we	struggle	to	fit	it	within	our	pre-existing	understandings.	Narratives	provide	anchors	that	help	us	keep	 hold	 of	 our	 shifting	world	 (Munro	 &	 Belova,	 2009)	 and	 in	 guilt	 we	 become	 un-anchored	from	these	familiar	narratives.	When	the	prevalent	narrative	no	longer	seems	to	 fit,	 there	 is	 a	 ‘narrative	 gap’	 -	 a	 break	or	 interruption.	 This	 gap	 is	 registered	 in	 the	body	 as	 the	 shift	 from	 a	 feeling	 of	 being	 at-home-in-the-world	 to	 a	 feeling	 of	 being	dislocated	and	unstable,	 as	was	seen	 in	 these	accounts.	With	no	adequate	narrative	at	hand,	events	and	feelings	cannot	immediately	be	integrated	in	a	way	that	makes	sense	of	what	 has	happened	 (Polkinghorne,	 1988).	 Participants	 are	 caught,	momentarily,	 in	 an	atemporal	experience	of	disruption	and	confusion,	a	narrative	gap	(‘senselessness’).	 In	these	 cases	 though	 (unlike	 some	 traumatic	 events)	 the	 experience	 is	 quickly	 brought	back	 into	 temporal	 order	 through	 agentic	 action.	 Participants	 describe	 a	 “clarification	
moment”	(Luke)	that	enabled	them	to	find	ways	to	“put	it	together	rationally”	(Edward).	They	 took	 particular	 actions,	 for	 example,	 making	 a	 decision	 to	 keep	 a	 secret,	apologising,	lying,	or	confessing,	which	seemed	to	allow	lived	and	chronological	time	to	fall	back	into	some	semblance	of	synchronicity.			
2.2	Parallel	Returns:	Reliving	and	re-narrating	guilt	After	 the	 initial	 overwhelming	 and	 dislocating	 atemporal	 guilt	 feelings,	 the	 guilt	experience	unfolds	into	two	parallel	temporal	loops:	experiences	of	return.	The	first	is	a	‘bodily	 return’,	 a	 re-living	of	 the	bodily	 guilt	 feelings	over	 and	over	 again.	The	 second	return,	 which	 traces	 a	 parallel	 arc,	 is	 a	 ‘narrative	 return’,	 which	 through	 reflective	narrative	accounts	attempts	to	encompass	and	make	sense	of	the	bodily	return.			
2.2.1	Reliving	guilt	feelings:	The	bodily	return	
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Without	an	adequate	narrative	to	organise	temporal	structure	into	past-present-future,	the	person	remains	 tied	 to	 their	guilt	 feelings,	and	psychologically	 ‘stuck’.	Participants	described	how	guilt	remained	eternally	present,	“always	in	the	back	of	my	mind”	(Luke).	Guilt	 is	“always	there”	(Jamie),	something	that	 is	hard	to	get	rid	of,	something	to	“dwell	
on”	(Alan).	As	chronological	time	passes,	the	feelings	fade	into	the	background,	only	to	pop	up	again	unexpectedly	whenever	they	are	triggered	back	into	existence,	which	can	be	“every	time	I	see	her”	(Luke).		Sam’s	guilt	feelings		disappeared	into	the	background	to	a	certain	extent,	but	remained	present	 for	 about	 “three	years,	 constantly”,	suddenly	 flooding	 his	 body	 again	with	 any	trigger.	Whenever	this	happened,	Sam	felt	he	has	been	transported	back	in	time	to	the	moment	he	first	experienced	guilt.	Receiving	an	SMS	message	makes	him	feel	like	he	is	stuck	on	a	perpetual	rollercoaster:	“oh,	oh	dear,	here	we	go	again	-		now	I	feel	bad”.	The	reoccurrence	of	the	guilt	feelings	takes	on	a	certain	familiarity,	and	with	every	mention	of	Gemma,	Sam’s	guilt	is	experienced	anew:		
Every	 time	 somebody	 asked	 how	 she	 was,	 or	 mentioned,	 or	 if	 she	 sent	 me	 a	
Christmas	card,	or	if	it	was	her	birthday,	I,	instead	of	remembering	the	good	things,	
I	 just	 got	 the	 guilt,	 the	 sinking,	 the	 same	 sinking	 feeling	 as	 I	 had	 in	 the	 airport,	
exactly	the	same.	[…]	It	was	like	unlocking	all	this	stuff	that	maybe	I	didn’t	want	to	
think	about	at	the	time,	because	I	thought	I	was	right	to	do	what	I	wanted	to	do.	
Then	each	time	the	guilt	turned	up,	a	new	memory	came	with	that.		Sam’s	experience	is	enduring,	and	has	a	loopy,	repetitive	nature,	as	triggers	cause	him	to	remember	 and	 re-experience	 his	 guilt-feelings.	 His	 feelings	 and	 sensations	 transport	him	back	in	time,	and	with	each	wave	of	guilt-feelings,	there	is	a	secondary	“unlocking”	of	memories.	Merleau-Ponty	(2002/1945)	describes	remembering	as	reaching	back	and	
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reopening	time.	In	guilt	though,	the	past	is	not	opened	voluntarily,	but	experienced	as	an	unwelcome	 intrusion.	 Paradoxically,	 whilst	 guilt	 feelings	 are	 experienced	 as	 eternally	present	 and	 “always	 there”,	 they	 feel	 unexpected	 and	 disconcerting.	 Feelings	 that	‘belong’	to	the	past	keep	“cropping	up”	anachronistically.	Luke	describes	being	“haunted”	by	his	feelings;	there	is	an	otherworldliness	in	the	way	these	feelings	are	revisited	upon	the	 body	 without	 agency,	 and	 they	 seem	 not	 only	 to	 belong	 to	 another	 time,	 but	 to	another	 person,	 as	 the	 guilt	 behaviour	 itself	 feels	 alien	 and	 strange	 (Lindsay-Hartz,	1984;	Karlsson	&	Sjöberg,	2009).			Through	multiple	 iterations	 of	 this	 bodily	 return,	 guilt	 is	 experienced	 as	 a	 permanent	presence	 hovering	 at	 the	 fringes	 of	 awareness,	 ready	 to	 flood	 the	 body	 anew	 at	 any	moment.	 It	 feels	 as	 if	 the	 guilt	 will	 “never	 go	 away”	 (Luke).	 Without	 a	 narrative	 to	integrate	 and	make	 sense	 of	 the	 feelings,	 they	 are	 relived	 over	 again	 (O’Brien,	 2007).	Sam	describes	this	as	a	feeling	of	“here	we	go	again”,	a	 ‘Proustian	rush’	where	the	past	appears	to	exist	in	the	present	(Munro	&	Belova,	2009),	but	as	an	invasion	to	be	‘braced	against’	rather	than	a	nostalgic	pleasure:			
That	feeling	kept	cropping	up	when	I	was	having	a	beer	or	something,	so	as	soon	as	
I	started	to	go	into	relaxing	mode,	an’	er,	perhaps	relaxing	too	much,	getting	drunk	
or	something,	that	feeling	kept	turning	up.	
	Every	 time	 Sam’s	 guard	was	 down,	 the	 guilt	 feelings	 returned,	 intruding	 into	 present	awareness	and	demanding	engagement.	The	bodily	return	is	involuntary,	uninvited	and	unpleasant.	 It	 amounts	 to	 a	 “past	 that	 won’t	 stay	 past”	 (O’Brien,	 2007,	 p211).	 It	 is	unsurprising	 that	 Sam	 wanted	 to	 “lose	 those	 feelings	 by	 any	 means	 possible”	 and	describes	 drinking	 to	 “get	 rid	 of	 all	 the	 things	 […]	 in	 my	 head”.	 He	 is	 desperate	 to	accelerate	time	and	‘move	on’.	
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2.2.2	Re-writing	guilt:	The	narrative	return	The	bodily	return	is	unexpected	and	painful,	yet	it	is	rich	with	pre-reflective	embodied	meaning	 that	 seeks	 expression	 (Lloyd,	 1993),	 so	 quickly	 a	 second	 loop,	 the	 ‘narrative	return’,	emerges.	This	re-writing	loop	attempts	to	“tame”	the	bodily	experience	(Reavey	&	Brown,	2006,	p190)	by	forcing	 it	 into	a	narrative	shape	that	permits	understanding.	Narrative	 is	 just	one	way	of	 languaging	experience,	but	 it	 is	particularly	pervasive	and	central	in	our	lives	(Polkinghorne,	1988).	Narratives	help	situate	our	experiences	within	our	 collective	 history	 (Merleau-Ponty,	 2002/1945,	 p503)	 and	 form	 a	 bridge	 between	lived	and	chronological	time	(Zahavi,	2012).	They	help	us	structure	and	make	sense	of	our	 experiences,	motivations	 and	behaviours,	 and	 those	 of	 others.	Narrative	 creates	 a	cohesive	 whole	 by	 weaving	 together	 separate	 aspects	 into	 a	 unified	 meaning	(Polkinghorne,	1988),	which	 is	 temporalised,	 to	say	what	happened	and	in	what	order	(O’Brien,	 2007).	 It	 is	 this	 temporal	 structuring	 of	 events,	 feelings	 and	meanings,	 that	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	emotional	experiences.			There	 is	 a	 human	need	 to	 create	 narrative,	 but	 finding	 a	 narrative	 that	 ‘fits’	 the	 lived	experience	can	be	difficult.	 Initially,	narrative	attempts	to	 impose	order	are	 infrequent	and	 lacking	 (Goldie,	 2003),	 but	 through	 a	 process	 of	 what	 Goldie	 (2000;	 2003)	 calls	
tâtonnement,	 through	 trial	 and	 error,	 there	 is	 a	 tentative	 ‘groping’	 towards	 the	 most	adequate	 narrative	 form.	 Narration	 involves	 a	 complex	 process	 of	 moving	 cautiously	within	the	hermeneutic	circle,	perhaps	starting	with	some	sense	of	narrative	shape,	but	slowly	 becoming	 aware	 of	 new	 saliencies	 that	 suggest	 further	 re-interpretation	 and	reshaping	(Goldie,	2003).	The	tâtonnement	process	is	a	feeling	for	a	narrative	that	feels	
right:	it	is	an	embodied	process.			
	 15	
In	guilt,	this	narrative	tâtonnement	is	complicated	because	the	feelings,	and	the	morally	threatening	nature	of	 the	circumstances,	 frequently	 lead	the	narrator	 to	 ‘hide’	parts	of	the	experience,	even	to	themselves,	through	self-deception	and	justification.	Events	and	feelings	 are	 partially	 revealed	 and	 partially	 concealed	with	 each	 re-narration,	 but	 are	also	 disrupted	 afresh	 by	 the	 bodily	 return,	which	 can	 be	 triggered	 unexpectedly.	 This	iterative,	interpretative	process	can	be	likened	to	a	palimpsest,	a	parchment	where	one	text	has	been	erased	to	make	way	for	new	text,	but	through	which	the	old	text	remains	partially	 visible.	 With	 each	 narrative	 return,	 a	 new	 layer	 is	 added	 to	 the	 palimpsest,	adjusted	to	incorporate	the	present	context	and	the	new	perspective	on	the	past.	Nelson	(2001,	 p76)	 describes	 narrative	 layers	 like	 these	 as	 a	 “tissue	 of	 stories”,	 which	 also	seems	to	capture	the	fragility	of	the	narration	process.		
	In	narrating	their	guilt	experiences,	participants	frequently	shifted	between,	or	layered,	different	narrative	threads	in	their	attempts	to	find	a	narrative	that	adequately	fit	their	bodily	 experience.	 Our	 analysis	 identified	 four	 consistent	 narratives	 that	 emerged	through	the	tâtonnement	process:		 a) I	 acknowledge	 I	 did	 wrong,	 but	 I	 was	 not	 myself:	 narratives	 of	 diminished	responsibility	that	excuse	a	behaviour	b) I	acknowledge	I	did	wrong,	but	the	ends	justify	the	means:	narratives	that	reframe	and	justify	a	behaviour	c) I	acknowledge	I	did	wrong,	but	I	am	no	longer	the	same	person:	narratives	of	self-development	that	distance	the	individual	from	a	behaviour	d) I	 need	 external	 judgement	 on	 my	 behaviour:	 narratives	 that	 function	 to	 elicit	judgment	from	others	and	position	the	narrator	as	impassive		
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Sam’s	early	attempts	at	narrating	his	guilt	experience	 involved	solely	blaming	himself,	and	 this	was	accompanied	by	 “constant”	 guilt	 feelings	 in	 the	bodily	 return.	Over	 three	years	 of	 the	 tâtonnement	 process,	a	 new	 narrative	 emerged,	 which	 acknowledged	 his	wrongdoing,	 but	 also	 contextualised	 his	 behaviour	 within	 the	 interpersonal	 situation	and	emphasised	how	he	has	 changed	as	a	person.	This	new	narrative	 suggests	he	has	learnt	from	his	mistakes	and	has	a	different,	more	mature,	perspective.		Retrospectively,	 he	 distances	 himself	 from	 his	 early	 narrative	 (self-blame)	 by	undermining	 it	 as	 “irrational	 thinking”.	 His	 new	 narrative	 (shared	 blame	 and	 self-development)	is	given	credibility	through	evidence	that	Gemma	herself	admitted	some	blame,	 and	 is	 given	 moral	 reinforcement	 through	 evidence	 that	 she	 is	 now	 happy	(suggesting	‘it’s	all	worked	out	for	the	best’):		 “She	was	like,	‘don’t	be	stupid,	I’m	absolutely	loving	being	over	here,	studying	and,	
er,	I	was	no	angel	to	live	with’.”		
	By	 accepting	 his	 own	 portion	 of	 blame,	 his	 narrative	 enables	 him	 to	 see	 himself	 as	someone	with	integrity	(“that’s	the	honesty	part	of	the	mixture”),	and	as	someone	who	is	moral,	who	wants	“to	be	a	different	person	than	that”.	With	this	he	can	distance	himself	from	his	guilty	past,	and	draw	a	line	between	him	then,	and	him	now.			
Tâtonnement	 usefully	 demonstrates	 how	 Sam	 tentatively	 engages	 with	 multiple	narrative	 threads	 until	 he	 finds	 a	 narrative	 that	 ‘fits’,	 and	 can	 therefore	 be	 deemed	successful.	 Goldie	 (2003)	 defines	 a	 successful	 person-narrative	 as	 having	 coherence,	
meaningfulness,	 and	 emotional	 import.	 A	 coherent	 narrative	 extracts	 “a	 configuration	from	 a	 succession”	 (Ricoeur,	 1990/1983,	 p66).	 It	 helps	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 person’s	actions	 at	 the	 time,	 allowing	 the	 listener	 (or	 thinker)	 “to	 grasp	 and	 make	 sense	 of	
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internal	perspectives”	(Goldie,	2003,	p305).	For	a	narrative	to	have	emotional	import,	it	must	 reflect	 the	 narrator’s	 new,	 external	 perspective	 upon	 events,	 showing	 their	evaluation	 and	 emotional	 response	 to	 what	 happened.	 A	 sincere	 narrative	 will	 be	infused	with	this	new	perspective,	which	will	“shape	and	colour”	it	(Goldie,	2003,	p306).	Sam’s	narrative	works	because	it	creates	a	balanced	account	of	the	multiple	contextual	factors,	makes	sense	of	his	painful	feelings,	but	allows	him	to	maintain	a	positive	sense	of	himself	as	mature	and	reflexive.		A	successful	narrative	need	not	be	perfectly	seamless,	as	long	as	it	manages	to	integrate	any	conflict,	distance	or	estrangement	that	is	part	of	the	lived	experience	(MacKenzie	&	Poltera,	 2010).	 Various	 strategies	 can	 form	 part	 of	 attempts	 to	 tell	 a	 successful	 guilt	narrative,	including	duplicity:		 “the	possibility	raises	its	head	of	a	narrative	that	satisfies	the	narrator,	that	gives	her	emotional	closure,	but	that	is	still	deeply	self-deceptive	[…]	We	all	know	only	too	 well	 of	 this	 possibility	 from	 our	 own	 lives:	 our	 own	 sometimes	 rather	desperate	 efforts	 (conscious	 and	 unconscious)	 to	 put	 our	 past	 actions	 into	 an	unreasonably	favourable	perspective”	(Goldie,	2003,	p314)		The	narratives	of	guilt	from	these	participants	were,	more	often	than	not,	riddled	with	ambivalence,	contradiction,	and	apparent	self-deception.	Sam’s	narrative	was	somewhat	unusual	 in	 that	 it	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	more	 successful	 of	 the	 four	 types	 identified.	Most	participants	seemed	to	be	stuck	at	the	tâtonnement	stage	of	the	process,	not	yet	having	found	 a	 narrative	 that	 could	 completely	 take	 account	 of	 their	 felt	 experience.	 For	example,	Edward,	whose	account	centred	on	his	infidelity,	claimed	to	have	fully	resolved	his	 experience,	 yet	 his	 narrative	 was	 full	 of	 contradictions	 and	 confusions	 (it	 lacked	coherence),	 and	 indicated	 apparent	 self-deception	 and	 concealment	 (it	 lacked	 a	
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convincing	external	persective)	rather	than	a	‘working-through’	of	what	had	happened.	(see	 Boden	 &	 Eatough,	 2014	 for	 a	 fuller	 account	 of	 Edward’s	 experience).	 Sam’s	narrative,	 in	 contrast,	 indicated	 he	 had	 accepted	 some	 responsibility	 and	 described	 a	sense	of	personal	development	suggesting	a	new,	external	perspective	had	been	found	and	enabling	a	sense	of	progression.	
	
2.3	Beyond	the	parallel	returns:	Synthesis	and	progression	The	 final	phase	of	 the	guilt	experience	 involves	synthesis	and	progression.	The	 felt	and	narrative	returns	calibrate	dialectically	with	one	another	towards	synthesis.	This	forms	a	feedback	effect	(Goldie,	2000);	the	guilt	feelings	influence	the	creation	of	an	adequate	narrative,	and	the	more	adequate	the	narrative,	the	less	intense	or	frequent	the	feelings.	As	 the	 successful	 narrative	 is	 found,	 the	 bodily	 returns	 lessen	 and	 the	 painful	 felt	experience	 juts	 and	 flickers	 less	 frequently	 through	 the	 narrative	 re-writes.	 The	synthesis	between	bodily	and	narrative	experience	aids	a	coherent	sense	of	body-self-world,	 which	 is	 more	 unified	 and	 less	 disrupted.	 When	 synthesis	 occurs,	 it	 is	experienced	 as	 a	 temporal	 progression;	 a	 shift	 from	 feeling	 ‘stuck’	 in	 never-ending	looping	 returns,	 to	 experiencing	 something	 new,	 an	 insight	 in	 terms	 of	 self-understanding.		Through	re-narrating	his	guilt	 experience	 into	a	 story	of	 self-development,	Sam’s	guilt	feelings	 eventually	 stop	 returning	 altogether	 and	 he	 experiences	 feelings	 of	peacefulness:		
I	 thought	 here’s	 a	 Gemma-feeling	 coming	 on,	 right,	 I’m	 thinking	 about	 Gemma,	
right	 brace	 yourself,	 this	 is	 going	 to	 be	 shit,	 erm,	 and	 it	wasn’t	 as	 bad	 anymore.	
Yeah	and	it	just	was	lessened,	and	there	was	more	the	feeling	of	happy-	happiness	
isn’t	the	right	word,	but	peacefulness	rather	than,	and	less	of	the	stinging	guilt,	and,	
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a	little	bit	there,	but	not	the	sting	of	it	so	much.	To	the	point	where,	I	saw	her	three	
months	ago	[…]	an’	there	was	none.		When	 a	 narrative	 ‘fits’	 (even	 if	 only	 loosely),	 the	 body	 that	 had	 been	 prominent	 and	foregrounded,	becomes	‘transparent’	again	(Fuchs,	2005).	This	‘disappearance’	happens	as	the	body	falls	 ‘in	 line’	with	the	successful	narrative	(Munro	&	Belova,	2009).	Sam	is	able	 to	 find	 what	 Stolorow	 (2007,	 p26)	 describes	 as	 “a	 relational	 home”	 where	experiences	 can	 be	 spoken,	 heard	 and	 understood.	 With	 this	 there	 is	 an	 affective	experience	 of	 relief,	 calm	 or	 peacefulness,	 just	 as	 Sam	 describes.	 Successful	 guilt	narratives	may	overcome	dislocation	and	 instability	by	enabling	guilt	 feelings	 to	make	sense	 to	 others.	 However,	 the	 sense	 of	 dislocation	 in	 guilt	 is	 also	 an	 alienation	 from	oneself;	the	experience	of	ambivalence	about	what	has	been	done,	the	hesitation	in	not	recognising	 one’s	 behaviour	 as	 one’s	 own,	 of	 not	 feeling	 familiar	 to	 oneself,	 or	 of	 not	fully	 understanding	 one’s	 own	 motivations	 or	 choices.	 In	 successful	 narratives,	 like	Sam’s,	 where	 the	 felt	 experience	 is	 synthesised	 within	 a	 temporally	 unfolding	progressive	narrative,	there	is	the	possibility	to	close	this	gulf.	Sam	was	able	ultimately	to	see	guilt	as	something	functional:		
“[guilt]	makes	 you	 a	 better	 person,	 because	 you	 don’t	 want	 that	 feeling,	 so	 you	
don’t	want	to	do	things	that	will	make	you	feel	guilty.	[...]	the	function	is,	I	think,	to	
make	you	more	of	the	person	you	aspire	to	be.”		
	Through	 the	 reorientation	 provided	 by	 his	 self-development	 narrative,	 Sam	 can	 view	this	painful	experience	as	something	good,	and	integrate	it	into	a	positive	over-arching	life	narrative.	It	is	an	aspirational	story,	where	the	protagonist	grows	into	a	better,	more	moral	 person.	 Successful	 narratives	 do	 not	 just	 structure	 the	 experience	 into	 a	
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meaningful	 shape,	 they	 have	 “instructional	 and	 directing	 properties”	 too	 (Munro	 &	Belova,	2009,	p90).	They:			 “demonstrate	 a	 meaningful	 succession	 of	 events.	 Things	 happen	 for	 a	 reason.	And	 then	 they	 are	 over.	 Time	 passes.	 Things	 change.	 There	 remains	 open	 a	possibility	for	recovery/redemption.”	(O’Brien,	2007,	p218).		To	move	beyond	guilt	is	to	find	the	emotional	closure	(Goldie,	2003);	a	meaningful	way	of	embedding	this	particular	emotion	experience	into	the	larger	experience	of	which	it	is	part,	the	lifeworld,	and	the	overarching	narratives	of	the	individual.		
	
3.	Conclusions	Drawing	on	first	person	accounts,	we	have	argued	for	a	theoretically	and	experientially	informed	model	that	attempts	to	map	how	guilt	unfolds	through	time.	Guilt	feelings	are	experienced	initially	as	atemporal	and	overwhelming,	such	that	subjective	experience	of	time	 is	 arrested.	 In	 this	 moment,	 the	 psychological	 pain	 of	 the	 guilt	 feelings	 is	experienced	 as	 an	 eternal	 present,	 with	 no	 sense	 of	 progression	 into	 the	 future.	 As	chronological	time	progresses,	the	individual	is	able	to	overcome	this	temporal	collapse	through	agentic	action	(taking	a	decision,	doing	something)	and	guilt	feelings	shift	into	the	background.	However,	 guilt	 then	unfolds	 into	parallel	 returns	as	 the	experience	 is	first	 relived,	 and	 then	 re-written	 in	 temporal	 loops.	 Guilt	 is	 relived,	 pre-reflectively,	through	a	bodily	 return,	 as	 guilt	 feelings	pop	up	unexpectedly.	Guilt	 is	 experienced	as	intrusive	and	anachronistic.	Secondly,	in	order	to	take	reflective	account	of	this	painful	and	disorienting	felt	experience,	a	second	temporal	loop	traces	the	same	arc	as	the	first	in	 order	 to	 re-write	 the	 experience	 through	 a	 narrative	 return.	 Narratives	 attempt	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 bodily	 feelings	 and	 to	 incorporate	 them	 into	 an	 overarching	 life-narrative,	 but	 these	 often	 stutter	 and	 struggle.	 Through	 the	 tentative	 tâtonnement	
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process,	 a	 narrative	 that	 can	 adequately	 contain	 the	 bodily	 experience	may	 be	 found.	This	narrative	may	be	one	of	 forgiveness,	maturity	or	self-development.	For	some	this	process	may	never	reach	a	conclusion,	but	 for	others,	 like	Sam,	 the	synthesis	of	bodily	experience	and	narrative	results	in	progression.	The	individual	no	longer	feels	‘stuck’	in	an	eternal	return	of	 intrusive,	haunting	guilt	 feelings,	but	 is	able	to	move	beyond	their	guilt	experience.		The	 development	 of	 a	 model	 of	 this	 type	 was	 made	 possible	 through	 our	 two-stage	analytic	 process.	 The	 first	 stage	 was	 a	 multi-modal	 hermeneutic-phenomenological	inductive	approach	that	supported	the	collection	of	‘experience-near’	accounts		(Boden	&	Eatough,	2014.	The	second	stage	was	an	abductive	analysis	that	enabled	us	to	extend,	broaden	and	deepen	our	initial	findings	through	dialogue	with	the	conceptual	literature.	Drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Peirce,	 Tavory	 &	 Timmermans	 (2014,	 p5)	 suggest	 that	abductive	 analyses	 involve	 “creative	 inferential	 process”.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 analysis	 is	generative	and	aims	to	result	in	new	theoretical	insights,	such	as	our	model.	This	would	not	 have	 been	 possible,	 we	 believe,	 if	 it	 were	 not	 for	 the	 strong	 phenomenological-heremenutic	 commitment	 in	 the	 initial	 studies.	 The	 patient	 ‘dwelling’	 in	 the	 data	 and	expansive	 interpretative	 strategies	 enabled	 us	 to	 develop	 a	 strong	 foundation	 from	which	 to	 leap	 into	 the	philosophical	 literature	without	 losing	sight	of	 the	participants’	lived	experience.			Emotion	 experiences	 involve	 specific	 patterns	 of	 bodily	 feeling	 (localised	 and	 diffuse,	foreground	 and	 background),	 particular	 experiences	 of	 lived	 time	 (accelerated,	decelerated	 or	 arrested),	 and	 specifically	 formed	 narratives	 (more	 or	 less	 adequately	accounting	 for	 felt	 experience	 and	 context).	 The	 model	 presented	 here	 rests	 on	 the	understanding	 that	 lives	 unfold	 through	 time,	 first	 bodily	 at	 a	 pre-reflective	 level,	through	feelings	that	tell	us	about	our	relation	to	ourselves	and	the	world,	and	secondly	
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through	 narratives	 that	 structure	 and	 temporalise	 lived	 experience.	 Despite	 our	participants	 describing	 retrospective	 experiences,	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 initial	methodology	 and	 the	 insights	 from	 narrative	 theory	 in	 the	 abductive	 analysis	 have	enabled	 us	 to	 disentangle,	 at	 least	 to	 some	degree,	 the	 complexities	 of	 how	 felt-sense	and	 (re)narration	 are	 inherent	 in	 the	 guilt	 experience.	 When	 bodily	 experience	 and	narrative	 find	 a	way	 to	 calibrate	 that	 results	 in	 a	 synthesis,	 the	 person	 experiences	 a	sense	 of	 closure	 and	 contentment.	 Experiences	 of	 body	 and	 time	 that	 had	 become	prominent	 in	 the	emotional	 experience,	 return	 to	 their	 transparent	 states.	The	person	no	longer	finds	themselves	lost	or	caught	out,	but	returns	to	experiencing	themselves	in	a	flowing,	at-homelike	engagement	with	the	world.	In	this	way,	feelings,	temporality	and	narrative	 play	 an	 interweaving	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 ‘working	 though’	 a	 difficult	emotional	experience.		
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